Sr Walter Ralegh K

Sr Walter Ralegh K

MAXIMS OF STATE.

Written by

Sir WALTER RALEIGH.

Whereunto is added

His *Instructions* to his SONNE;

AND

The Son's ADVICE *to his Aged Father.*

LONDON,

Printed by *W. Bentley*, and are to be sold by *W. Shears*, at the sign of the *Bible*, over against the North door of *Paul.* 1651.

MAXIMS
OF
STATE.

Written by
WALTER RALEIGH,

Addressed to
His Nephew Sir Lewis
SONNE.

Printed by Thomas Harper, and
Assigns of Felix Kyngston.

Printed by Thomas Harper, and are to be
Sold by Nicholas Bourne at the Exchange,
over against the Royal
Exchange.

THE CONTENTS.

Page.

OF Government. 1
Of Policie. 2
Of Monarchie. 3
Of Aristocracie, or Senatory State. 5
Of Free State, or Popular State. 6
Of Tyranny. 7
Of Olygarchie, or the Government of a few. ibid.
Of a Common-wealth. 8
Of causes of States, and Com-

mon-wealths in general. 10
Of founding a State. ibid.
Of Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth. 15
Of Mysteries or Sophisms. ibid.
Of Axioms or Rules of preserving a State. 19
Rules for preserving of a kingdom. { Hereditary. Conquered. } 25
Kingdoms hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a Prince. ibid.
Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by 10. *Rules.* 35
Rules politick of Tyrants. 41
Sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny. 42
Sophisms of the sophistical, or subtile

subtile Tyrant, to hold up his State. 46
Of preservation of an Aristocratie. 52
Of preservation of an Olygarchie, by { Sophisms. Rules. } ibid.
Of Conversion of States in general. 59
Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular. ibid.
Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts. 60
Of sedition. 61
Causes of sedition are of two sorts. ibid.
Of alteration without violence 64
A Method, how to make use of the

the Book before. in the reading of the storie. 67
Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government. ibid.
Example of the like practice in Charls *the Fifth.* 68
Of observation for the Affirmative and the Negative. ibid.
Of defence for David *in marrying* Abishag. 70

Political Nobility.

Of Adoniah *aspiring to the Kingdom.* 71

Observations.

Of ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom, and marks to discern them. 73
Political Prince. 75

The

THE

TABLE

Of the Chapters contained in Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s INSTRUCTIONS to his SON.

CHAP. Page.

I. *Virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends.* 1

II. *Great care to be had in the choosing of a Wife.* 4

III. *Wisest men have been abused by flatterers.* 10

IV. *Private Quarrels to be avoided.* 11

V. *Three Rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans*

mans estate. 17
VI. *What sort of servants are most fit to be entertained.* 20
VII. *Brave rags wear soonest out of fashion.* 21
VIII. *Riches not to be sought by evil means.* ibid.
IX. *What Inconveniences happen to such as delight in Wine.* 23
X. *Let God be thy Protectour, and Directour in all thy Actions.* 27

MA-

MAXIMS OF STATE.

OF GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is of two sorts. 1. *Private*, of himself. *Sobrietie.* Of his Family; called *Oeconomie.* 2. *Publick*, of the Common-wealth; called *Policie.* A man must first Govern himself, e're he be fit to govern a Family: And his Family, e're he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth.

Of Policie.

Policie is an Art of Government of Common-wealth, and some part o it according to that State, or form o Government wherein it is setled fo the publick good.

State, is the frame or set order o a Common-wealth, or of the Gover nours that rule the same, specially o the chief and Sovereign Governou that commandeth the rest.

The State or Sovereignty consiste in 5. points.

1. Making or anulling of Laws.
2. Creating and disposing of Mag strates.
3. Power over life and death.
4. Making of War, or Peace.
5. Highest or last appeal.

Where these five are, either in o or in more, there is the State.

These five points of State, rest o ther in,

1. One *Monarchie* or Kingdom.
2. Some few chief men for virtu and wisdom, called an *Aristocracie*.
3. Many, called a *Free-State*, or P *pular-State*.

These three sorts of Governme

ha

have respect to the common good, and therefore are just, and lawful *States*.

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments. *viz.*

1. *Monarchie*,	into	1. *Tyrannie*.
		2. *Oligarchie*.
2. *Aristocracie*,		3. *Common-wealth* or Government of all the common and baser sort, and therefore called a *Common-wealth* by an usurped *Nickname*.
3. *Popular Estate*,		

These all respect their own, and not the publick good, and therefore are called Bastard *Governments*.

I.

Monarchie.

A *Monarchie*, or Kingdom, is the *Government* of a *State* by one head, or chief, tending to the common benefit of all.

Monarchie, or *Kingdoms*, are of three sorts touching the right, or possession of them; *viz.*

1. *Hereditarie*, by descent, as the *English*, *French*, &c.

2. *Elective*, by suffrage of the other *Orders*, or some of them, as the *Polonian*.

3. *Mixt*, or of both kinds; *viz.* by Descent, yet not tyed to the next of bloud, as the ancient *Jewish State*.

Monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or authority; *viz.*

1. *Intire*. Where the whole power of ordering all *State* matters, both in peace and war, doth by law and custom appertain to the Prince, as in the *English* Kingdom; where the Prince hath power to make Laws, League, and War; To creare Magistrates; to pardon life: Of appeal, *&c.* Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making Laws, yet ever subject to the Princes pleasure, nor Negative will.

2. *Limited* or *restrained*, that hath no full power in all the points of matters of State, as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time of peace, as the making of Laws, *&c.* But in War onely, as the *Polonian* Kings.

H. Ari

II.

Aristocracie, or Senatorie State.

AN *Aristocracie* is the Government of a Common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the publick good.

Aristocracies are of three sorts, *viz.* Where the *Senatours* are chosen, for 1. *Virtue*, *Riches*, and the Common good, as the *Venetian*.

2. *Virtue* and the publick good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the *Roman*, when some of the *Senatours* were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schools.

3. *Virtue* and wealth, more respecting their private, than their publick good, which inclineth towards an *Oligarchie*, or the Government of the Richer or nobler sort, as in *Rome* towards the end.

III.

Free-State, or Popular State.

THe *Popular State* is the Government of a *State* by the choiser sort of people, tending to the publick good of all sorts; *viz.* with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.

In every *Just State*, some part of the Government is, or ought to be imparted to the People; As in a Kingdom, a voice or suffrage in making Lawes; and sometimes also, in levying of Arms (if the charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in Judicial matters, may in part be referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state, or kind of Government: And where the multitude is discontented, there must needs be many enemies to the present *State*. For which cause, Tyrants, (which

(which allow the people, no manner of dealing in *State* matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other means whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in *Russland*, *Turkey*, &c.

IV.

Tyranny.

A *Tyranny* is the swerving, or distorting of a *Monarchie*, or the *Government* of one, tending not to the publick good, but the private benefit of himself, and his followers. As in the *Russe* and *Turkish Government*, where the *State* and *wealth* of other orders, are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperour. This is the worst of all the Bastard *States*, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a *Monarchie*, which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself.

V.

Oligarchie, or the Government of a few.

AN *Oligarchie* is the swerving, or the corruption of an *Aristocracie*;

or the *Government* of some few, th
are of the Wealthier or Nobler sor
without any respect of the public
good. The chief end of these *Gov*
nours, is, their own greatness and e
riching. And therefore their manne
is, to prepare fit means to upho
their Estates. This *State* is not whol
so bad, as is the *Tyrannie*, and ye
worse than the *Common-wealth*, be
cause it respecteth the good of a few

VI.

Common-wealth.

A *Common-wealth* is the swerving o
depravation of a *Free, or popula*
State, or the Government of the whol
multitude of the base and poorer sor
without respect of the other Orders.

These two *States*, to wit, *The Ol*
garchie, and *Common-wealth*, are ver
adverse the one to the other, and hav
many bickerings between them. Fo
that the richer or nobler sort, suppos
a right or superiority to appertain unt
them in every respect, because they
are superiour, but in some respects one
ly, to wit, in Riches, Birth, Parentage
&c. On the other side, the *Common*
people suppose, there ought to be a
equality

quality in all other things, and some *State matters*; because they are equal with the Rich or Noble, touching their *Libertie*, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour, as touching *Government* and fitness thereunto, because they are rich, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, *&c.* But because they are *Wise*, *Virtuous*, *Valiant*, &c. and so have fit parts to *Govern a State*.

These several *States* are sometimes mixed, and inter-wrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the *Roman State*, the people had their *Plebiscita*, and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates: Yet the *Senate* (as the *State* stood) for the most part swayed the *State*, and bare the chief rule. So in the *Venetian State*, the Duke seemeth to represent a *Monarch*, and the *Senate* to be his Councel: Yet the Duke hath no power in *State matters*, but is like a head set on by art, that beareth no brain. And so that *State* is *Senatorical or Aristocratical*.

Causes of States & Common-wealths in general.

Causes of *States* or of *Common-wealths* are of 3. sorts, *viz.*

1. *Founding*, or setling a *State* where to be considered.
   1. *Measure.*
   2. *Parts*, & their *Qualities.*
2. *Preserving* a *State.*
3. *Changing*, and *altering* a *State.*

Founding a State.

In *founding* a *State* are to be considered 2. things.

1. *Proportion.*
2. *Parts.*

Proportion, is a Just Measure or *Mediocritie* of the *State*, whereby it is framed and kept in that Order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind, to wit, so that a Monarch be not too Monarchical, nor strict, or absolute, as the *Russe* Kings; nor *Aristocratical*, that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobility, as the *Scottish* Kingdom, but ever respective to the other degrees. That *Aristocratie* be not so magnificent nor intire to it self, but communi-

municate with the people some commodities of *State* or *Government*, as the *Venetians*, and sometimes the *Romans* allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make *Plebiscita*, &c. So a *Free-State* or *Common-wealth* that it be not over popular, *viz.* That it depress not to much the richer, wiser, nor learneder sort; but admit them to offices with a *Caution* out of the rules and mysteries of that *State*. That they seek no alteration of the present *State*. The reason, because the *moderate States* in their several kinds (as all other things that observe the mean) are best framed for their continuance, because they give less cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the *wealth*, *Honour*, and *Libertie* which they see in others that *govern* the *State*; And so are less subject to stirs and commotions, and easiest kept in their present *State* wherein they are set.

Parts.

THe *Parts of the State*, or those *Magistrates* that bear place or sway in the publick *Government*.

Parts or *Partakers* of *Publick Government*, are

1. *Coun-*

1. *Counsel* or *Senate*, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace, Magistrates, *&c.* in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care, that they may be men expert in *matter of Policie*, because it is their *Trade* and *Vocation*, as men use to chuse Pilots, and Masters of Ships, such as know the Art of *Navigation*, and not Husband-men, *&c.* And so the contrary.

2. *Magistrates* and *Officers*, which are to be executioners of that which is consulted, and found to be expedient for the *Common-wealth*, wherein are to be observed, the kinds of Magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of *Government*; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen.

3. *Judges*; To determine in *Civil*, and *Criminal matters*, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner of *Judgement*, and *Judicial* proceeding.

In *Magistrates* are to be observed.

1. Kinds of *Magistrats* as,

1. *Civil*

1. *Superiour*, which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the *State*, as *Consuls* for a year, and not perpetual *Dictatours in a Senatorie State*. *Prætors*, & *Censors*, that oversee manners & orders of the people.

For a Kingdom *Lieutenant* of Shires, *Marshals*, *Masters of Horse*, *Admirals*, &c.

Inferiour, *as conservatours of Peace*, *Constables*, &c.

Overseers of youth, that take care for their education for civil & warlike exercise.

Clarks

Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity, and price of victual.

Ediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

Questours, or *Treasurers*, to keep and dispence the publick Treasury.

Actuaries, or *Recorders*, which keep the publick *Records*.

Gaolers, to keep *prisons* and *Prisoners*.

Surveyours of woods and fields, *&c.*

2. *Ecclesiastical.*

1. As *Bishops* or *Pastours*, *Elders*, *wardens*.

2. *Time of* Magistrates, whereof some are perpetual, some for a time, *viz.* for more years, a year, half a year, according to the necessity of the *Common-wealth*, and not perpetual; or at least not *Hereditary* in a Kingdom. Yearly in an *Aristocracie*, or half yearly

yearly in a *Free-State*.

3. *Manner* of choise, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage, and not by Lot.

Causes preserving a State, or Common-wealth.

In preserving of *States*, 2. things required.
- 1. *Mysteries*, or *Sophisms*.
  - 1. *General to all States.*
  - 2. *Particular*, for every several *State*.
- 2. *Rules*, or *Actions*.
  - 1. *General*, for all *States*.
  - 2. *Particular*, for every *State*.

Mysteries, or Sophisms.

MYsteries, or *Sophisms* of *State*, are certain secret practises, either for the avoyding of danger, or averting such effects as tend to the preservation

vation of the present *State*, as it is set or founded.

State Mysteries are of two sorts.

1. *General*: That pertain to all *States*; as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree, or part of the *Common-wealth*, do not exceed both in *Quantity* and *Quality*. In *Quantity*, as that the number of the *Nobility*, or of great persons, be not more, than the *State* or *Common-wealth* can beare. In *Quality*, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, *&c.* more than it is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the Scale: So in Common-wealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in *Quality*, and *Quantity*, overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations, and conversions of *State*. *Secondly*, to provide by all means, that the middle sort of People exceed both the extreams, (*viz.*) of *Nobility* and *Gentry*, and the base rascal, and begarly sort. For this maketh the *State* constant and firm, when both the *Extreams* are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together, it is not to be feared. To these two points, the *Particu-*

lar

ler rules or *Sophisms* of every *Common-wealth*, are to be applied.

2. *Particular*: That serve for preservation of every *Common-wealth*, in that form of *State* wherein it is setled as in a Kingdom. That the *Nobility* may be accustomed to bear the *government* of the *Prince*, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the *Princes* eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the *Princes Court*, under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see, and enjoy their presence; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to be attendant upon the Prince, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the Prince, and be as *Hostages* for the good behaviour, and faithfull dealing of their Parents, especially, if they be of any suspected note. To that end serves the *Persian* practise, in having a Band, or Train of the *Satrapa's* children, and other Nobles to attend the Court; which was well imitated by our Train of *Henchmen*, if they were of the Nobler sort. Again, sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow

greater

greater sums and never pay: So in an *Oligarchy*, least it decline to a *Popular State*, they deceive the people with this and the like *Sophisms*, (*viz.*) They compel their own sort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalties, to frequent their Assemblies for choosing of Magistrates, for provision of Armour, warlike Exercises, making an Execution of Laws, *&c.* By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer, but to suffer the poorer, and meaner sort to be absent, and to neglect those Assemblies under pretence, that they will not draw them from their business, and private earnings,: Yet withall to cite thither some few of them, (*viz.*) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort, to make a shew, that they would have the people or poorer sort, partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies, with the tediousness of consultations, greatness of Fines, if they should mis-do, to the end, to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with those *Consultations*; by which means, the richer sort do still *govern* the *State*, with the peoples liking, and good contentment.

Axioms.

Axioms.

Axioms or *Rules* of preserving the *state* are,
- 1. *General*, that serve for all *Common-wealths*.
- 2. *Particular*, that serve for every *several State*.

General Rules.

1. THe first and principal *Rule of Policie* to be observed in all *States*, is to profess, and practise, and maintain the true worship and *Religion* of Almighty God prescribed unto us in his word, which is the chief end of all *government*. The *Axiom*, That God be obeyed simply without exception, though he command that which seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to *Humane policy*; as in the *Jews Common-wealth*, That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times, leaving none to defend their coast, though being beset with many Enemies. Not to sow the seventh year, but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine, *&c.*

2. To

2. To avoid the causes of *Conversions*, whereby *States* are over-thrown, that are set down in the Title of conversions; For that *Common-wealths* (as natural bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and *State* thereof, and are so cured by contrary medicines.

3. To take heed, that no *Magistrate* be created or continued contrary to the Laws and policy of that *State*. As that in a *Senate*, there be not created a perpetual *Dictator*, as *Cæsar* in *Rome*. In a Kingdom, that there be no *Senate*, or *Convention* of *equal power* with the Prince in *State* matters, as in *Poland*.

4. To create such *Magistrates* as love the *State* as it is setled, and take heed of the contrary practise, as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom, or *Aristocracie*. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present *State*.

5. To that end to have certain Officers to pry abroad, and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort, agreeable to the present *State*, but desire rather to be under some other form, or kind of *government*.

6. To

6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to be observed in that *Common-wealth* which is governed by a few of the richer sort; For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his *Common Fees*, the common sort, and such as want honour, take in good part that they be not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business. But if the *Magistrate* buy and sell matters, the common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debar'd of those preferments, and of that gain they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the *Germain Oligarchies* continue so firm; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the richer sort are by that means freed, and secured from being under the poor.

7. To take heed that the *State*, as it is setled and maintained, be not overstrict, nor exceed in his kind; (*viz.*) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchical, nor a *Popular State* too *Popular*: For which cause it is good, that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts, though in-

inferiour for place and Office; And sometimes popularly with the common people, which is the cause that some *Common-wealths*, though they be very simply, and unskilfully set, yet continue firm, because the *Magistrates* behave themselves wisely, and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour; and therefore some kind of *Moderate Popularity* is to be used in every *Common-wealth*.

8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaking and altering of Lawes, as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several *State*. For the disease and alteration of a *Common-wealth*, doth not happen all at once, but grows by degrees, which every common wit cannot discern, but men expert in POLICIE.

9. To provide, that that part be ever the greater in number and power, which favours the *State* as now it stands. This is to be observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths.

10 To observe a mean in all the degrees, and to suffer no part to exceed or decay over much. as first for pre-

ferments, to provide that they be rather small and short, than great and long; and if any be grown to overmuch greatness, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the *Sophisms* are to be practised (*viz.*) to do it by parts and degrees; to do it by occasion, or colour of law, and not all at once. And if that way serve not, to advance some other, of whose virtue and faithfulness, we are fully assured, to as high a degree, or to a greater honour; and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) be more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the *Sophisms* of a *Popular State*, *viz.* to send him on Emballages, and Forreign Negotiations, or imploy him in some Office that hath great charges, and little honour, *&c.* To which end, the *Edileship* served in some Commonwealths.

11. To suppress the Factions, and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and Factions.

12. To

12 To increase or remit the common Taxes and Contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the People and *Common-wealth*. If the people be increased in Wealth, the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased. If they be poor, and their Wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of Traffick, *&c.* to forbear Taxes and Impositions, or to take little. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The *Sophisms* that serve for Impositions, are these, and other of like sort, to pretend business of great charge, as War, building of Ships, making of Havens, Castles, Fortifications, *&c.* for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises, wherein some part may be bestowed, the rest reserved for other expences; but Princely dealings needs no pretences.

13 To Provide that the *Discipline* & *Training* of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that *Common-wealth*: As that in a Kingdom, the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court, that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince: In the *Senatory State*, that the sons of the *Senatours* be not idly, nor over dain-

laintily brought up, but well instruct-
d and trained up in *Learning*, *Tongues*,
nd *Martial Exercise*; that they may
e able to bear that place in the Com-
mon-wealth, which their Father held,
nd contrariewise, in a *Popular*
State,

14. To take heed, least their *Se-*
bism, or secret practises for the conti-
nance and maintenance of that *State*,
e not discovered; least by that means
hey refuse and disappoint themselves,
ut wisely used, and with great se-
recie.

Particular Rules.

Rules and *Axioms*, for reserving of a King-om. { *Hereditary.* / *Conquered.* }

Kingdoms Hereditary, are preserved at home by the ordering,

HIm*self*; *viz.* By the tempering and moderation of the Princes *ower* and *Prerogative*. For the less nd more *temperate* their *Power* and *tate* is, the more firm, and stable is

 their

their Kingdom and *Government*; because they seem to be further off from a Master-like, and *Tyrannical Empire*; and less unequal in condition to the next degree, to wit, the *Nobility*, and so less subject to grudge and envy.

2. *Nobility*, *viz.* By keeping that degree and due *proportion*, that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm, or *State* can bear, as the *Scottish* Kingdom, and sometime the *English*, when the Realm was overcharged with the number of *Dukes*, *Earls*, and other *Nobles*; whereby the *Authority of the Prince* was eclipsed, and the Realm troubled with their *Factions and Ambitions*. Nor that any one excel in Honour, Power, or wealth, as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom, as the house of *Lancaster* within this Realm. To this end, not to load any with too much Honour or preferment, because it is hard even for the best, and worthiest men, to bear their greatness, and high Fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all *States*. The *Sophism* for preventing, or reforming this inconvenience, are to be used with great caution and wisdom. If any

gre

great person be to be abated, not to deal with him by *calumniation*, or *forged matter*, & so to cut him off without desert, especially if he be gratious among the people, after the *Machiavillian Policie*, which besides the injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once, which maketh a desperate *Discontentment* in the party, and a commiseration in the peole, and so greater love, if he be gracious for his virtue, and publick service. Nor to banish him into forreign Countries, where he may have opportunity of practising with *Forreign States*, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the example of *Coriolanus*, *Henry* the fourth, and such like. But to use these, and the like *Sophisms*, *viz.* To abate their greatness by degrees, as *David Joabs*, *Justinian Bellisarius*, &c. To advance some other Men to as great, or greater Honour, to shadow, or over-mate the greatness of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends, and followers by *preferments*, *rewards*, and other good and lawfull means; especially, to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of

the *Common-wealth*, whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the *State*.

3. *People*, *viz.* So to order and behave himself, that he be loved, and reverenced of the *People*. For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies, or forreign Invasion, if he be firmly loved of his own people. The reason, for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise, nor any refuge, being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended, hath cause to fear every moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt; *viz.* if he seem as a *Tutor*, or a *Father* to love the people, and to protect them, if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom; For that nothing is more popular, nor more pleasing to the people, than is peace.

4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously, yet with *State* and *Majesty* to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like.

5. If

5. If he sit himself sometimes in open *Courts*, and place of *Justice*, that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people. If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City, which he maketh the *seat of his Empire*, and so make it sure and faithfull unto him, which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the Sun in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions; and least the furthest parts at one end move, whilest the Prince is in the other. If he go in progress many times to see his Provinces, especially, those that are remote.

6. If he gratifie his *Courtiers* and *Attendants* in that sort, and by such means, as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as wich *Monopolits*, and such like.

7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seem grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are gratefull, and well pleasing to himself, as the *French* Kings, who for that purpose, as may seem, have erected their *Court* at *Pa-*

ris, which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the *Nobles* and the *People*.

8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the same justly without *defalcation* of any part by his Exchequer, or other Officer.

9. If he avoid all such things as may breed *hatred*, or *contempt* of his person, which may be done, if he shew himself not too *light*, *inconstant*, *hard*, *cruel*, *effeminate*, *fearfull*, and *dastardly*, &c. But contrarywise, *Religious*, *Grave*, *Just*, *Valiant*, &c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the *Machiavilian Policie*, with far the best means to keep the people in obedience, than love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.

10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision, which is to be rumoured, and made known abroad: if it be known, that he is reverenced, and obeyed by his peoples at home.

11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him, that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion; which if it happen, he is to joyn speedily with other Princes, which

are in like danger to abate that greatness, and to strengthen himself and the rest against it. An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of *Spain.*

12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other means, to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince, with whom he hath differences, if any thing be intended against his *State.* Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad, about that Princes *Court*, under colour of Embassage, or some other *pretence*; which must be men of *skill* and *Dexterity* to serve for that turn.

13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey, and not to encounter them with his *Prerogative*, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts, especially if it tender to take from them *their commodities*, and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and *Ministers.*

14. To provide especially, That that part, *which favoureth the State* as it standeth, be more *potent*, than the other which *favoureth it not*, or desireth a change.

15. To make ſpecial choice of good and ſound men to bear the place of *Magiſtrates*, eſpecially, of ſuch as aſſiſt the *Prince in his Counſels, and Policies*, and not to lean over much to his own adviſe, contrarie to the rule of *Machiavil*, who teacheth, *That a Prince can have no good counſel, except it be in himſelf*; his reaſon, *becauſe if he uſe the counſel of ſome one, he is in danger to be over-wrought, and ſupplanted by him*; & if he counſel with more, *Then he ſhall be diſtracted with the differences in opinions*. As if a Prince of great, or mean wiſdom, could not take the *Judgement of all his Counſellorurs* in any point of *Policie*, or of ſo many as the himſelf thinketh good, and to take it either by word, or in writing; and himſelf then in private peruſe them all, and ſo *after good and mature deliberation*, make choice of the beſt, without any diſtraction or binding himſelf *to the direction of one*. For the Proverb is true, *that two eyes ſee more than one*; and therefore the adviſes, and *Conſultations of a Senatory State*, is compared by ſome *to a Feaſt, or dinner, where many contribute towards the ſhot, by which means they have more variety of diſhes, and ſo better fare; and yet every man may make choice of*

tha

that dish, that serveth him best for his health and appetite.

16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice, and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity, whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of *Solomon*, which may seem the reason, why our Kings of *England* had their Kings-Bench in place of publick Justice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that sate in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, some special causes may be selected, which may throughly be debated and considered upon by the Prince in private, with the help and advise of his learned Councel, and so be decided publickly, as before is said, by the Prince himself; At least, the Prince is to take accompt of every Minister of publick Justice, that it may be known, that he hath a care of Justice, and doing right to his people, which makes the Justicers also to be more careful in performing of their duties.

17. To be moderate in his Taxes, and impositions; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse, to do it by Parliaments, and with their

consents, making the cause apparent unto them, and shewing his unwillingness in charging them. Finally, so to use it, that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects, than an exaction by him.

18. To stop small beginnings; unto this end to compound the dissentions that arise amongst the Nobles, with caution, that such as are free be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole *Common-wealth* set in a *combustion*; as in the example of the *Barons Wars*, and the late Wars of *France*, which grew from a quarrel betwixt the *Guision Faction*, and the other *Nobility*.

19. To stir up the people, if they grow secure, and *negligent of Armour*, and *other provision* for the *Common-wealth*, by some rumour or fear of danger at home, to make more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldom to be used, least it be supposed a false Alarm, when there is need indeed.

20. To have special care, that his children, especially, the heir apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King, *viz.* in learning, specially of mat-

matters pertaining to *State*, and in Martial exercise, contrary to the practise of many Princes, who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting, *&c.* which by reason of their defects, afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of *State.*

II.

Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these means.

1. FIrst, if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions, as have his own Countrey, it is an easie matter to retain such Countries within their obedience, in case the Princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct. For men of the same *quality*, *tongue*, and *condition*, do easily *shole*, and *combine themselves together*, so much the rather, if the people of that countrey have served before, and were not accustomed to their *own Liberty*, wherein specially is to be observed

ſerved, that the laws and cuſtoms of that purchaſed Countrey be not altered nor innovated, or at leaſt it be done by little and little. So the *Burgundians* and *Acquitains* were annexed to *France*. The reaſon, becauſe *partly they have been accuſtomed to ſerve, and partly, for that they will not eaſily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the Bloud Royall be once extinguiſhed.* As for the invaſion of a foreign Coutrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living, ; It is not the part of a juſt Civil Prince, much leſs a Prince Chriſtian to enforce ſuch a countrey; and therefore, the *Machiavilian* practiſes in this caſe, to make ſure work by extinguiſhing wholly the *Bloud Royal*, is lewd and impertinent: The like is to be ſaid of murthering the Natives, or the greateſt part of them, to the end he may hold the reſt in ſure poſeſſion. A thing not onely againſt *Chriſtian Religion*, but it is inhumane injuſtice, cruel, and barbarous.

2. The ſafeſt way is, (ſuppoſing a right) that ſome good part of the Natives be tranſplanted into ſome other place, and our Colonies, conſiſting of ſo many as ſhall be thought meet.

meet, be planted there in some part of the Province, *Castles*, *Forts*, and *Havens*, seized upon and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the *Babylonian Monarch*, which *Transplanted* 10. *Jews*: And of the *Romans* in *France*, *Tribes of the Germany*, *Britany*, and other places. The reason:

1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot, are to be maintained within the *Province*, which cannot be done without great charge.
2. For that the whole *Province* is troubled and grieved with removing and supplying the Army with victuals, carriages, *&c.*
3. For that Colonies are more sure and faithful, than the rest.

As for the Natives that are removed from their former seats, they have no means to hurt, and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to be quiet.

The *Turks* practise in *Asia*, where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the Souldiers, whom

whom they call, *Timariota*.

That the Prince have his seat and his residence, in his new purchase, especially, for a time, till things be well settled; especially, if the *Province* be great and large, as the *Turks* in *Greece*: The reason;

1. Because the presenee of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects.
2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes presence, if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants, and inferiour Governours: Where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts, that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression.
3. Because being present, he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, he cannot do, or not do in time.
4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new pur-

purchases be committed to such as be sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Princes favour, and not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious for their *Nability*, or *Virtue*; especially, if the *Province* be great, and somewhat far distant, which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects. As for such *Governours*, as depend wholly upon the Princes favour, being not born, but created *Noble*, they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty, and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers, to keep them in Subjection, and not for any ill will.

4. To have the children of the chief Noble men, and of greatest Authority, Hostages with them in safe keeping, the more the better: For that no bound is stronger, than that of nature, to contain the Parents and Alies in obedience, and they the rest.

5. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behoveful for the esta-

blishing

blishing of the present *Government.*

6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable, and well affected so much as may be, that they may seem by being conquered, to have gotten a protectour, rather than a Tyrant; For the *Common-People*, if they enjoy peace, and be not distracted nor drawn from their business, nor exacted upon beyond measure, are easily contained under obedience; Yet notwithstanding, they are to be dis-used from the practise of Arms, and other Exercises which increase courage, and be weakened of *Armour*, that they have neither spirit, nor will to rebel.

7. If there be any faction in the Countrey, to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part, and to combine with it, as *Cæsar* in *France.*

8. To look well to the *Borders*, and confining *Provinces*, and if any rule there of great, or equal power to himself, to joyn league with some other *Borderers*, though of less strength, to hinder the attempts (if any should be) by such neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a Countrey infested by one neighbour Prince, calleth in

an-

another, of as great, or greater power, to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the *Romans* were called into *Greece*, by the *Ætolians*; the *Saxons*, by the *Britains*, the *Danes*, by the *Saxons*.

9. To leave their Titles and dignities to the Natives, but the command and Authority, wholly to his own.

10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the *Sophisms* of Policy, especially those that appertain to a Tyrannical State, which are soon detected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser, and better sort of his subjects, whereof must needs follow very ill effects.

The *Sophisms* of Tyrants, are rather to be known, than practised, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannical States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

Rules Politick of Tyrants.

RUles practised by *Tyrants* are of 2. sorts. *viz.*

1. *Barbarous*, and *Professed*, which is pro-

proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves, without others help, as in the *Turkish*, and *Russe* Government.

2. *Sophistical*, and *Dissembled*; As in some States that are reputed for good and lawfull *Monarchies*, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet setled, nor have power sufficient of themselves; but must use the power and help of others, and so are forced to be Politick *Sophisters*.

I.

Sophisms of a Barbarous and professed Tyranny.

TO expel and banish out of his countrey all honest means, whereby his people may attain to learning, wisdom, valour, and other virtues, that they might be fit for that estate, and servile condition. For that these two, learning, and martial exercise, effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: *viz.* Wisdom, and Valour. For that men of spirit and understanding, can hardly endure a Servile State.

To

To this end, to forbid learning of liberal Arts, and Martial exercise; As in the *Russe Government*, so *Julian* the *Apostata* dealt with the Christians. Contrarywise, to use his people to base occupations, and Mechanical Arts, to keep them from idleness, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted, and so made unfit for great enterprises. So the *Egyptian* Kings dealt with the *Hebrews*; So the *Russe* Emperour with his *Russe* people: And *Charles* the fifth with the *Netherlanders*, when he purposed to enclose their Priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute Government.

2. To make sure to him, and his State, his *Military* men by reward, liberty, and other means, especially, his Guard, or *Prætorian Band*; That being partakers of the spoil and benefit, they make like that *State*, and continue firm to it; as the *Turk*, his *Janizaries*; the *Russe*, his *Boyarens*, &c.

3. To unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means, whereby they may

may resist his power; And to that end, to have his set and ordinary exactions, *viz.* Once in two, three, or four years, and sometimes yearly, as the *Turk* and *Russe*; who is wont to say, *That his people must be used as his flock of sheep*, viz. *Their fleece taken from them, least it overlade them, and grow too heavy*; *That they are like to his beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow.* And if there be any of extraordinary wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the Tax come about, or upon some devised matter, to confiscate their goods, as the common practise is of the *Russe* and *Turk*.

4. To be still in Wars, to the end, his people may need a Captain; and that his Forces may be kept in practise, as the *Russe* doth yearly against the *Tartar*, *Polonian*, and *Sweden*, &c.

5. To cut off such as excel the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility; or be of a pregnant, or a spiring wit, & so are fearfull to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold Office, or any honour, but onely of him; as the *Turk*, his *Bashaes*; and the *Russe*, his *Ruezzes*.

6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feastings, and other Assemblies among the

the people, that they have no means or oportunity to conspire, or confer together of publick matters, or to maintain love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the *Russes* practise.

7. To have their Beagles, or listeners in every corner, and parts of the Realm; especially, in places that are more suspect, to learn what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, & take away such as mislike their *State*.

8. To make Schism, and Division among his Subjects, *viz.* To set one Noble man, against another, and one Rich man against another, that through Faction & disagreement among themselves, they may be weakened, and attempt nothing against him, and by this means entertaining whisperings, and complaints, he may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the *Russe* made the Faction of the *Zemsky*, and the *Oppressinie*.

9. To have strangers for his Guard, and to entertain *Parasites*, and other base and servile fellows, not too wise, and yet subtile, that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he com-

commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.

All these practises, and such like, may be contracted into one or two, *viz.* To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitation.

I. I.

Sophisms of the Sophistical, or subtile Tyrant, to hold up his State.

1. TO make shew of a good King, by observing a temper and mediocritie in his Government, and whole course of life; To which end, it is necessary, That this subtile Tyrant, be a cunning Polititian, or a Machiavilian at the least, and that he be taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and is thought thereby, not unworthy for to Govern others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent

an

and not terrible in his ſpeech, and geſture, and habite, and other demeanour.

3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth; And to that end, to ſeem loath to exact Tributes, and other Charges; and yet to make neceſſity of it, where none is: To that end, to procure ſuch War as can bring no danger toward his State, and that might eaſily be compounded, or ſome other chargeable buſineſs; and to continue it on, that he may continue his exaction and contribution ſo long as he liſt. And thereof to imploy ſome in his publick Service, the reſt to hoord up in his Treaſury, which is ſometimes practiſed even by lawfull Princes, as *Edward* the fourth in his Wars againſt *France*, when having levied a great ſum of Money throughout his Realm, eſpecially of the *Londoners*, he went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an account by open ſpeech, and publick writing, of the expence of ſuch Taxes and Impoſitions, as he hath received of his ſubjects, that he may ſo ſeem to be a good Huſband, and frugal, and not a robber of the Common-wealth.

5. To

5. To that end, to bestow some cost upon publick buildings, or some other work for the Common good, especially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his Realm, that so he may seem a benenefactour, and have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey, or doing some good for it.

6. To forbid feastings, and other meetings, which increase love, and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses, To that end, the Curfieu Bell was first ordained by *William the Conquerour*, to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour.

7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great, but rather, many equally great, that they may envy, and contend one with another; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort, to do it warily, and by degrees; If quite to wreck him, and to have his life, yet to give him a lawfull tryal, after the manner of his Countrey; And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation, as to do him contumely, or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace, are things contrary unto Honour,

nour, which great spirits do most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, than to any thankfulness, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismission; True in *Atheists*, but not in true *Christian Nobilitie.*

8. To unarm his people, and store up their weapons, under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arm with them, such and so many as he shall think meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men.

9. To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the people, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine not together, and that himself by hearing the griefs and complaints, may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an account.

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, specially, about womens matters, by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been the ruin of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of *Tar-*

quinius, by *Brutus*, *Appius*, by *Virginius*, *Pisistratus*, by *Harmodius*, *Alexander Medices*, Duke of *Florence*, *Alfus* of *Placentia*, *Rodericus*, King of *Spain*, &c.

11. To that end, to be moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely, that he be not seen; For that men sober, or watchfull, or such as seem so, are not lightly subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their own.

12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize; or do any special action for the Common-wealth, in that manner as it may seem, they could not be better regarded, in case they lived in a *Free-state*.

13. All rewards and things gratefull, to come from himself, but all punishments, exactions, and things ungratefull, to come from his Officers, & publick Ministers; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he see his people discontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects.

14. To pretend great care of Religion, and of serving God, (which hath been the manner of the wickedest

Ty-

Tyrants) for that people do less fear any hurt from those, whom they think Virtuous and Religious, nor attempt likely to do them hurt, for that they think that God protects them.

15. To have a strong & sure Guard of forreign Souldiers, and to bind them by good turns, that they having at least profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As *Caligula*, the *German* Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practised by Lawfull Kings, as by the *French* King.

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT, for their own safetie.

17 To take part, and to joyn himself with the stronger part; if the Common people, and mean degree be the stronger, to joyn with them; if the Rich and Noble, to joyn with them. For so that part with his own strength, will be ever able to overmatch the other.

18. So to frame his manners & whole behaviour, as that he may seem, if

not perfectly good, yet tolerably ev[illegible] or somewhat good, somewh[illegible] bad.

These Rules of Hypocritical Tyrants, are to bee known, th[illegible] they may be avoyded, and m[illegible] withall, and not drawn into imitation.

Preservation of an Aristocracie.

RUles to preserve a *Senatory Stat*[illegible] are partly taken from the commo[illegible] Axioms, and partly from those th[illegible] preserve a Kingdom.

Preservation of an Oligarchie, *by* { *Sophisms* / *Rules.*

1. IN Consultations and Assemblies, about publick affairs, to order th[illegible] matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies, and Councels, ; But to impo[illegible] a Fine upon the richer sort, if they omit that duty. On the other side, to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to bear with them under

der pretence, that they may the better intend their Occupations, and not be hindered in their Trades, and earnings.

2. In Election of Magistrates, and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow, and abjure the bearing of Office, under colour of sparing them, or to enjoyn some great charge, as incident to the Office, which the poor cannot bear. But to impose some great Fine upon those, that be Rich, if they refuse to bear Office, being Elect unto it.

3. In judicial matters: In like manner to order, that the people may be absent from publick Trials, under pretence of following their business. But the Richer to be present, and to compel them by Fines, to frequent the Court.

4. In Warlike exercise and Arms: That the poor be not forced to have Armour, Horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exercises; but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor, Horse, &c. by excessive Fines, and to exercise themselves in War-like matters, &c.

5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts, Policie, and Warlike exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as *Popular States* are preserved by the frequencie, and Liberty of the People, so this Government of the Richer, is preserved by discipline, and *good order* of *Governours*.

6. To provide good store of Warlike furniture, especially of *Horse*, and *Horse-men*, and of *Armed men*, viz. *Pike* &c. which are proper to the gentry, as *shot*, and light furniture, are for a *Popular Companie*.

7. To put in practise some points of a *Popular State*; *viz.* To lade no one man with too much preferment. To make yearly, or half years Magistrates, *&c.* For that the People are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatness, to abate him by the *Sophisms* fit for this State.

8. To commit the Offices and Magistracies, to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this State, and pleaseth the people, for that they reap some re-

relief, and benefit by it.

9. To the same end, To contract marriages among themselves, the rich with the rich, *&c.*

10. In some things which concern not the *Points*, and *matters of State*, as Electing Magistrates, making Laws, *&c.* to give an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the Common People, and not to do, as in some *Oligarchies* they were wont; *viz.* To swear against the People, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary; To minister an Oath at their admission; *That they shall do no wrong to any of the People*; and if any of the richer offer *wrong* to any of the *Commons*, to shew some example of severe punishment.

For other *Axioms* that preserve this State, they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a *Popular*, and *Tyrannical State*; for the strict kind of *Oligarchie*, is kin to a Tyranny.

Preservation of a popular State; { *Sophisms.* / *Rules* or *Axioms.*

1. IN publick Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, publick Justice, and Exercise of arms, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an *Oligarchie.* For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies, Magistrates, Offices, Warlike Exercises, *&c.* by mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises.

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath been in some Popular States; but rather to preferre them in all other matters, that concern not the State and publick Government.

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons by Lot, or Ballating, and not to choose any for their wealth sake.

4. To take heed, that no mã bear office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, and salary, *&c.* is to be reserved to

the

their own hands, to be disposed of by a Common-Council, *&c.* And to see that no man be too highly preferred.

5. That no Magistracy be perpetual, but as short as may be, to wit, for a year, half year, *&c.*

6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth, to give an accompt of their behaviour and government, and that publickly before the Commons.

7. To have publick Salaries and allowance for their Magistrates, Judges, *&c.* And yearly dividents for the common people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts, so they have some aptness to perform that duty.

9. To provide that publick Judgements and Trials be not frequent; and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Petrifoggers and Dilators, as the law requireth, *&c.* Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State, whereby many times the popular State is turned into an *Oligarchie*, or some other Govern-

ment. Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law, made against Accusers and Calumniatours: *Ad Senatus-consultum Turpilianum*, l. 1. *de Calumniatoribus.*

10. In such free States as are popular, and have no revenue, to provide that publick Assemblies be not after: because they want salary for Pleaders and Oratours; And if they be rich; yet to be wary, that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Common revenue among the multitude, is like a purse or barrel without a bottom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs.

11. If the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places, and to provide above all, that none do live idly, but be set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Copyholds, such decayed Citizens.

12. To be well advised what is good for this State, and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State, that seemeth most popular; but that which is best for the continuance thereof: And

to that end, not to lay into the *Exchequer*, or *Common-Treasurie*, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it be practised, confiscations, and fines of the Common people would be frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.

Conversion of States in general.

CONversion of a State, is the declining of the Common-wealth, either to some other form of Government, or to his full and last period appointed by God.

Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular.

GEneral, (*viz.*) 1. Want of Religion: *viz.* of the true knowledge and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of *Saul*, *Uzziah*, the Jewish State; the four Monarchies, and all other.

2. Want

2. Want of wisdom and good Counsel to keep the State, the Prince, Nobles, and people in good temper; and due proportion, according to their several orders and decrees.

3. Want of Justice, either in administration (as ill Lawes, or ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self; *viz.* Of provision, as Armour, Money, Captains, Souldiers, *&c.* Execution, when the means or provision is not used, or ill used.

2. *Particular*: To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules, that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealths.

Particular causes of Conversion of States, are of two sorts.

1. *Forreign*: By the over-greatness of invasion of some forreign Kingdom, or other State of meaner power,

power, having a part within our own, which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State. This falleth out very seldom for the great difficulty to overthrow a forreign State.

2. Domestick: { Sedition or open violence by the stronger part. Alteration without violence.

Sedition.

SEdition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of Arms against the superiour power, *Quasi ditio secedens.*

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.

1. General: { Liberty: WHen they, that are of equal quality in a Commonwealth, or do take themselves so to be, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these three.

Riches: Or, when they are so

	so unequal in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with less respect than those that be of less defect in these three things, or in any of them.
Honour	

1. IN *the Chief:* Covetousness or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (*viz.*) when the Magistrates, especially the Chief, encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the publick or (private calamity, whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in *Olygarchies*) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrel against the Chief, as in Kingdoms: The examples of *wat Tyler*, *Jack Straw*, &c.

2. *In the Chief:* Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power, are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as *Coriolanus*, *Cyrus minor*, Earl of *Warwick*. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have over-much, and

and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or less, than they deserve as they suppose; & so in envy and disdain, seek Innovation by open faction, so *Cæsar*, &c.

4. Some great necessity or calamity; So *Xerxes* after the soil of his great Army. And *Senacharib* after the loss of 185. in one night.

1. ENvie, when the chief exceed the mediocrity before-mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him; as *Brutus Cassius, &c.* against *Cæsar*.

2. *Fear, viz.* Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practice or force, to prevent his own danger, as *Artabanus* did *Xerxes*.

2. *Particular.*

3. *Lust* or *Lecherie*, as *Tarquinius Superbus*, by *Brutus*; *Pisistratindæ*, by *Armodius*, *Appius* by *Virginius*.

Chief.

4. *Contempt*; For vile quality & base behaviour, as *Sardanapalus* by *Arbaces*; *Dionysius* the younger by *Dion*.

5. *Con-*

Other degrees.

5. *Contumely*; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit, who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as *Caligula* by *Chæreas*.

Other degrees.

6. *Hope* of *Advancement*, or some great profit, as *Mithridates*, *Anobarsanes*.

Alteration without violence.

CAuses of alteration without violence are; 1. *Excess* of the State; when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was, or should have been setled, and exceedeth in power, riches, and absoluteness in his kind, by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes, and impositions, *&c.* applying all to his own benefit, without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government, as a Kingdom into a Tyranny, an *Oligarchie* into an *Aristocratia*.

2. *Excess*, of some one or more in the Common-wealth; *viz.* When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow

grow to an excellency or excess above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or virtue; and so by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the Sovereignty: By which means, popular States grow into *Oligarchies*; and *Oligarchies* and *Aristocrasies* into *Monarchies*. For which cause the *Athenians* and some other free States, made their Laws of *Ostrocismos*, to banish any for a time that should excel, though it were in virtue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an unjust Law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means, that none should grow to that heigth and excellency, than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy.

FINIS.

A Me-

A METHOD, how to make use of the Book before, in the reading of the Story.

DAVID *being seventie years of age, was of wisdom, Memorie, &c. sufficient to govern his Kingdom;* 1. Reg. Cap. 1.

Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government.

DAvid *being of great years, and so having a cold, drie, and impotent bodie, married with* Abishag, *a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole Realm, to revive his bodie and prolong his life,* 1. Reg. Chap. 1. verse. 3.

Exam-

Example of the like practise in *Charles* the fifth.

DAvid *being old and impotent of body, by the advise of his Nobles and Phisitians, married a young maid called* Abishag, *to warm and preserve his old body.*

Observation.

VVHether David *did well in marrying a maid? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man, to marrie a young woman; or on the other side, for an old, worn, and decrepite woman, to marrie a young and lustie man?*

For the affirmative.

ARG. *The end of marriage is Societie and mutuall comfort; but there may be Societie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young partie;* Ergo, 'tis Lawful.

Answ. *Societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage; but none of the princi-*

pal

pal ends of marriage: which are:

1. { *Procreation of children, and so the continuance of mankind.*
2. { *The avoiding of Fornication.*

As for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man, woman and woman, where no marriage is, and therefore no proper ends of marriage.

The Negative.

ARG. 1. *That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent, and young partie hath no respect to the right end, for which marriage was ordained by God.* Therefore it is no lawful marriage.

2. *No contract, wherein the partie contracting, bindeth himself to an impossible condition, or to do that which he cannot do, is good or lawfull. But the contract of marriage by an impotent person, with a young partie, bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot do, viz. to perform the duties of Marriage; Therefore it is unlawfull.*

For

For the same cause, the civil Law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmitie of the man, in which case she can have no wrong, being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent, because Volenti non fit injuria: —— In legem Julian. de adulteriis leg. Si uxor, *&c.*

It provideth further, for the more certaintie of the infirmitie, That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men that have been infirm at the first, by reason of sicknes, or some other accident, afterwards proved to be sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis.

Defence for *David*, in marrying *Abishag*.

IT was rather a Medicine, than a marriage, without any evil, or disordered affection.

2. *It was by the perswasion of his Nobles, and Phisitians.*

3. *It was for the publick good, to prolong the life of a worthie Prince.*

4. *It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid, who was made*

a-

acquainted with the Kings infirmitie, and to what end she was married unto him; who if she did it for the common good, and for duties sake, having withall the gift of continencie, she is to be commended; if for ambition, or some vain respect, it is her own, and not Davids *fault.*

Political Nobilitie.

Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom.

First, took the advantage of Davids *affection and kindness towards him, and made him secure of any ill dealing.*

Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his Father as unfit for Government.

Thirdly, blazed his title, and Right to the Crown.

Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and Footmen, and a guard to make shew of State.

Fifthly, being a comly, and goodly Person, made a popular shew of himself, and his qualities.

Sixt-

Sixtly, joyned to himself in Faction Joab, *the General of the Armie, who was in displeasure for murthering of* Abner, *and* Amaza, *and feared that* David *would supplie* Benajah *in his place, and so was discontented. And* Abiathar *the high Priest, that was likewise discontented with* David, *for the preferment of* Zadoch.

Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under pretence of a vovv, and offering at the Fountain of Raguel, *in the confines of* Judea.

Eightly, made a shevv of Religion by Sacrificing, &c.

Ninthly, made himself familiar vvith the Nobles and people, and entertained them vvith feasting.

Tenthly, drevv into his part the chief Officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by revvards, Familiarities, &c.

Eleventhly, disgraced and abased the Competitour, and such as he knevv vvould take part vvith him, and concealeth his ambition, and purpose from them.

Tvvelfily, had Jonathan *a Favorite of the Court, and near about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing vvere discovered, and moved at the Court vvhile*

whilest himself was in hand about his practise.

OBSERVATIONS.

Waies of such as aspire to the Kingdom, & marks to discern them.

First, they wind into the Princes favour by service, officiousness, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyaltie and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practises.

2. *They take advantage of the Princes infirmities, age, impotencie, negligence, sex, &c. And work upon that by disabling the Prince, and secret detracting of his State, and Government.*

3. *They blaze their Title, and claim to the Crown, (if they have any) with their friends and favourites.*

4. *They provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces, and furniture for the wars, make much of good Souldiers, and have a pretence (if it be espied) of some other end, as for the Kings honour, or service, and to be in readiness against forreign enemies, &c.*

5. They make open shew of their best qualities, and comliness of their person (which though it be vain as a dumb shew, it is very effectual to win the liking of the popular sort, which according to the rule of the election of Kings, in the Bees Common-wealth; think that Forma est digna imperare) Activitie, Nobilitie, Ancestrie, &c.

6. To have their blazers abroad, to set out their virtues, and to prepare their friends in every Province.

7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto them, of the chief Peers, and men of best qualitie, such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers, and the Militarie men, and most subtile and politick, especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the State.

8. To have meetings for conferrence under some pretence of some ordinarie matter in some convenient place, not too near, nor too far off, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition.

9. To take up a shew, and pretence of Religion, more than before, and beyond the practise of their former life.

10. They use popular courtesie (which in a great person is verie effectual) feasting, liberalitie, gaming, &c.

11. To

11. *To be over liberal, and win to them by gifts, familiaritie, &c. the chief Officers of the Court, and Governours of Shires.*

12 *To have some near about the Prince, to keep them in credite, and remove suspition, if any rise.*

13. *To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the Prince, and present* State, *or to the competitour, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all means they can, and to conceal the designs from them, least they be discovered before they be too ripe.*

14. *To have some spie near about the Prince, to advertise them if any inckling of suspition arise, whilest themselves are practising.*

Note the practises of Absolom: 2 Sam. chap. 16. *And of* Cyrus minor *in* Xenophon; Περιαγωγῆς. cap. 1.

Political Prince.

David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom, valour, religion,

and justice, and so highly deserving of the commonwealth, yet grown into age, grew withal into contempt, & had many, both of his Nobles, & common people, that fell from him; first with *Absolom*, then with *Adoniah*, who affected the Kingdom, and rebelled against him: For remedy whereof, he stirred up himself to publick actions, which might shew his vigour and sufficiencie to mannage the affairs of his Kingdom.

1. *After the victorie against* Absolom, *he forced himself to forbear mourning, and shewed himself to his discontented Army, when all wore like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son.*

2. *After*

2. *After the victorie, he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to* Jerusalem, *which was a renewing, and re-establishing of him.* 2 Sam. 19. 12.

3. *He gave an experiment of his power and authoritie, by deposing a person of great authoritie and estimation, to wit,* Joab, General Captain *of the Armie, and advancing* Amasa *to his place.*

4. *He sent kind Messengers to* Jerusalem, *and to other chief and head towns, and speciall men of* Judea, *his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words,* That they were of his own flesh and bloud, *with protestation of his special love and affection towards them, to provide them with the like kindness and affection towards him.*

5. *He assembled a* Parliament *of his whole realm, and took occasion upon the designing of his successour, to commend unto them the succession of his house, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worship and religion then established, and gave a grave and publick charge to his Successour, now designed, touching the manner of his government, and maintaining of religion.* 1. Chron. 12. 13.

6. *He shewed his bountie and magnifi-*

cence in congesting matter for the building of the Temple, *as gold, silver, brass, &c. And caused it to be published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation,* 1. Chron. 22.13.

7 *He revived the Church Government, and set it in a right order, assigning to every Church, Officers, his place and function.*

8. *He suppressed the faction of* Adoniah, *and ordained* Solomon *his Successour,* 1 Reg. 1. 22. *By these means, he retained his Majestie and Authoritie in his old age, as appeareth by the effect; for that being bed-rid, he suppressed the faction of* Adoniah, (*which was grown mightie, and was set on foot*) *with his bare commandment, and signification of his pleasure, and so he dyed in peace.*

FINIS.

SIR Walter Raleigh's INSTRUCTIONS To his SON: And to Posteritie.

The fourth Edition,

Corrected and enlarged according to the Authours own Copy.

LONDON,

Printed by *W. Bentley*, and are to be sold by *W. Shears*, at the sign of the *Bible*, over against the North door of *Pauls*. 1650.

SIR Walter Raleigh, To His SON.

CHAP. I.

Virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends.

THere is nothing more becoming any wise man, than to make choice of friends, for by them thou shalt be judged what thou art: let them therefore bee wise and virtuous, and none of those that follow thee for gain; but make election rather

ther of thy Betters than thy Inferiours, shunning always such as are poor and needy, for if thou givest twenty gifts, and refuse to do the like but once, all that thou hast done will be lost, and such men will become thy mortal enemies: Take also especial care, that thou never trust any friend or servant, with any matter that may endanger thine estate; for so shalt thou make thy self a bond-slave to him that thou trustest, and leave thy self alwayes to his mercy: And be sure of this, thou shalt never find a friend in thy young years, whose conditions and qualities will please thee after thou comest to more discretion and judgement; and then all thou givest is lost, and all wherein thou shalt trust such an one, will be discovered. Such therefore as are thy inferiours, will follow thee, but to eat thee out, and when thou leavest to feed them, they will hate thee; and such kind of men, if thou preserve thy estate, will always be had: And if thy friends be of better quality than thy self, thou mayest be sure of two things: the first, That they will be more carefull to keep thy counsel, because they have more to lose than thou hast: the second, They will esteem

thee

thee for thy self, and not for that which thou doest possess; but if thou be subject to any great vanity or ill (from which I hope God will bless thee) then therein trust no man; for every mans folly ought to be his greatest secret. And although I perswade thee to associate thy self with thy betters, or at least with thy Peers, yet remember always that thou venter not thy estate with any of those Great-ones, that shall attempt unlawfull things, for such men labour for themselves, and not for thee; thou shalt be sure to part with them in the danger, but not in the honour; and to venture a sure estate in present, in hope of a better in future, is meer madness: And Great-men forget such as have done them service, when they have obtained what they would, and will rather hate thee for saying thou hast been a mean of their advancement, than acknowledge it.

I could give thee a thousand examples, and I my self know it, and have tasted it in all the course of my life; when thou shalt read and observe the Stories of all Nations, thou shalt find innumerable examples of the like: Let thy love therefore be to the best,

so

ſo long as they do well; but take heed that thou love God, thy Countrey, thy Prince, and thine own eſtate, before all others: for the fancies of men change, and he that loves to day, hateth to morrow; but let Reaſon be thy School-miſtreſs, which ſhall ever guide thee aright.

Chap. II.

Great care to be had in the chooſing of a Wife.

THe next and greateſt care ought to be in the choice of a Wife, and the onely danger therein, is Beauty, by which all men in all Ages, wiſe and fooliſh, have been betrayed. And though I know it vain to uſe Reaſons or Arguments, to diſſwade thee from being captivated therewith, there being few or none, that ever reſiſted that Witchery; yet I cannot omit to warn thee, as of other things, which may be thy ruin and deſtruction. For the preſent time, it is true, that every man prefers his fantaſie in that appetite, before all other worldly deſires, leaving the

the care of honour, credit, and safety, in respect thereof; But remember, that though these affections do not last, yet the bond of Marriage dureth to the end of thy life; and therefore better to be born withal in a Mistress, than in a Wife, for when thy humour shall change, thou art yet free to chuse again (if thou give thy self that vain liberty.) Remember secondly, that if thou marry for Beauty, thou bindest thy self for all thy life for that which perchance will neither last nor please thee one year; and when thou hast it, it will be to thee of no price at all, for the desire dieth when it is attained, and the affection perisheth, when it is satisfied. Remember, when thou wert a sucking Child, that then thou didst love thy Nurse, and that thou wert fond of her, after a while thou didst love thy Drie-nurse, and didst forget the other, after that thou didst also despise her, so will it be with thee in thy liking in elder years; and therefore, though thou canst not forbear to love, yet forbear to link, and after a while thou shalt find an alteration in thy self, and see another far more pleasing than the first, second, or third love: yet I wish thee above all the rest, have a care thou

dost

dost not marry an uncomely Woman for any respect; for comelinesse in Children is riches, if nothing else be lest them. And if thou have care for thy races of horses, and other beasts, value the shape and comelinesse of thy Children, before alliances or riches: have care therefore of both together, for if thou have a fair Wife, and a poor one, if thine own estate be not great, assure thy self that Love abideth not with want; for she is thy companion of plenty and honour; for I never yet knew a poor Woman exceeding fair, that was not made dishonest by one or other in the end. This *Bathsheba* taught her Son *Solomon*; *Favour is deceitfull, and Beautie is vanitie*: she saith further, *That a wise woman overseeth the ways of her Houshold, and eateth not the bread of idlenesse.*

Have therefore ever more care, that thou be beloved of thy wife, rather than thy self besotted on her; and thou shalt judge of her love by these two observations: first, If thou perceive she have care of thy estate, and exercise her self therein; the other, If she study to please thee, and be sweet unto thee in conversation, without thy instruction, for Love needs no teaching

ing nor precepe. On the other side, be not sower or sterne to thy wife, for cruelty engendereth no other thing than hatred: Let her have equal part of thy Estate whilest thou liveſt, if thou find her sparing and honest; but what thou giveſt after thy death, remember that thou giveſt it to a stranger, and moſt times to an enemy, for he that shall marry thy Wife, will deſpiſe thee, thy memory, and thine, and shall poſſeſs the quiet of thy labours; the fruit which thou haſt planted, enjoy thy love, and ſpend with joy and eaſe what thou haſt ſpared, and gotten with care and travel: Yet always remember, that thou leave not thy Wife to be a shame unto thee after thou art dead, but that ſhe may live according to thy eſtate; eſpecially, if thou haſt few Children, and them provided for. But howſoever it be, or whatſoever thou find, leave thy Wife no more than of neceſſity thou muſt, but onely during her Widowhood; for if ſhe love again, let her not enjoy her ſecond love in the ſame Bed wherein ſhe loved thee, nor ſhie to future pleaſures with thoſe feathers which Death hath pulled from thy wings; but leave thy eſtate to thy Houſe and Children, in which thou liveſt upon

on earth whileſt it laſteth. To conclude, Wives were ordained to continue the generations of men, not to transfer them, and diminiſh them, either in continuance or ability; and therefore thy Houſe and eſtate, which liveth in thy Son, and not in thy Wife, is to be preferred. Let thy time of marriage be in thy young and ſtrong years; for believe it, ever the young Wife betrayeth the old Huſband, and ſhe that had thee not in thy flower, will deſpiſe thee in thy fall, and thou ſhalt be unto her but a captivity and ſorrow. Thy beſt time will be towards thirty, for as the younger times are unfit, either to chuſe or to govern a Wife and family; ſo if thou ſtay long, thou ſhalt hardly ſee the education of thy Children, which being left to ſtrangers, are in effect loſt, and better were it to be unborn, than ill bred; for thereby thy Poſterity ſhall either periſh, or remain a ſhame to thy name and family. Furthermore, if it be late ere thou take a Wife, thou ſhalt ſpend the prime and ſummer of thy life with Harlots, deſtroy thy health, impoveriſh thy eſtate, and endanger thy life; and be ſure of this, that how many Miſtreſſes ſoever thou haſt, ſo many enemies thou ſhalt

pur-

purchase to thy self; for there never was any such affection, which ended not in hatred or disdain. Remember the saying of *Solomon, There is a way which seemeth right to a man, but the issues thereof are the wages of death*; for howsoever a lewd woman please thee for a time, thou wilt hate her in the end, and she will study to destroy thee. If thou canst not abstain from them in thy vain and unbridled times, yet remember that thou sowest on the sands, & dost mingle thy vital bloud with corruption, and purchasest diseases, repentance, and hatred onely. Bestow therefore thy youth so, that thou mayest have comfort to remember it, when it hath forsaken thee, and not sigh and grieve at the account thereof: whilest thou art young thou wilt think it will never have an end; but behold, the longest day hath his evening, and that thou shalt enjoy it but once, that it never turns again, use it therefore as the Spring time, which soon departeth, and wherein thou oughtest to plant, and sow all provisions for a long and happy life.

CHAP.

Chap. III.

Wisest men have been abused by flatterers.

TAke care thou be not made a fool by flatterers, for even the wisest men are abused by these. Know therefore, that flatterers are the worst kind of Traitors; for they will strengthen thy imperfections, encourage thee in all evils, correct thee in nothings, but so shadow and paint all thy vices and follies, as thou shalt never, by their will, discern evil from good, or vice from virtue. And because all men are apt to flatter themselves, to entertain the addictions of other mens praises, is most perillous. Do not therefore praise thy self, except thou wilt be counted a vain-glorious fool, neither take delight in the praises of other men, except thou deserve it, and receive it from such as are worthy & honest, and withal warn thee of thy faults; for flatterers have never any virtue, they are ever base, creeping, cowardly persons. A flatterer is said to be a beast that biteth smiling, it is said by *Isaiah* in this man-

ner:

nor: My people, they that praise thee seduce thee, and disorder the paths of thy feet; and *David* desired God to cut out the tongue of a flatterer. But it is hard to know them from friends, so are they obsequious and full of protestations; for as a wolf resembles a dog, so doth a flatterer a friend. A flatterer is compared to an Ape, who because she cannot defend the house like a dog, labour as an ox, or bear burdens as a horse, doth therefore yet play tricks, and provoke laughter: Thou mayest be sure that he that will in private tell thee thy faults, is thy friend, for he adventures thy mislike, and doth hazard thy hatred; for there are few men that can endure it, every man for the most part delighting in self-praise, which is one of the most universal follies, which bewitcheth mankind.

CHAP. IV.

Private quarrels to be avoided.

BE carefull to avoid publick disputations at Feast, or at Tables, among

mong cholerick or quarrelſom perſons; and eſchew evermore to be acquainted or familiar with Ruffians, for thou ſhalt be in as much danger in contending with a brawler in a private quarrel, as in a battel, wherein thou mayeſt get honour to thy ſelf, and ſafety to thy Prince and Countrey; but if thou be once engaged, carry thy ſelf bravely, that they may fear thee after. To ſhun therefore private fight, be well adviſed in thy words and behaviour, for honour and ſhame is in the talk, and the tongue of a man cauſeth him to fall.

Jeſt not openly at thoſe that are ſimple, but remember how much thou art bound to God, who hath made thee wiſer. Defame not any woman publickly, though thou know her to be evil; for thoſe that are faulty cannot endure to be taxed, but will ſeek to be avenged of thee, and thoſe that are not guilty, cannot endure unjuſt reproach. And as there is nothing more ſhamefull and diſhoneſt, than to do wrong, ſo truth it ſelf cutteth his throat that carrieth her publickly in every place. Remember the divine ſaying, *He that keepeth his mouth, keepeth his life.* Do therefore right to all men

men where it may profit them, and thou ſhalt thereby get much love, and forbear to ſpeak evil things of men, though it be true (if thou be not conſtrained) and thereby thou ſhalt avoid malice and revenge.

Do not accuſe any man of any crime, if it be not to ſave thy ſelf, thy Prince, or Countrey; for there is nothing more diſhonourable (next to Treaſon it ſelf) than to be an Accuſer. Notwithſtanding, I would not have thee for any reſpect looſe thy reputation, or endure publick diſgrace, for better it were not to live, than to live a coward, if the offence proceed not from thy ſelf; if it do, it ſhall be better to compound it upon good terms, than to hazard thy ſelf; for if thou overcome, thou art under the cruelty of the Law, if thou art overcome, thou art dead or diſhonoured. If thou therefore contend, or diſcourſe in argument, let it be with wiſe and ſober men, of whom thou mayeſt learn by reaſoning, and not with ignorant perſons, for thou ſhalt thereby inſtruct thoſe that will not thank thee, and utter what they have learned from thee, for their own. But if thou know more than other men, utter it when it may do thee honour,

nour, and not in assemblies of ignorant and common persons.

Speaking much also, is a sign of vanity; for he that is lavish in words, is a niggard in deeds; and as *Solomon* saith, *The mouth of a wise man is in his heart, the heart of a fool is in his mouth, because what he knoweth or thinketh, he uttereth*: And by thy words and discourses, men will judge thee. For as *Socrates* saith, *Such as thy words are, such will thy affections be esteemed; and such will thy deeds as thy affections, and such thy life as thy deeds.* Therefore be advised what thou dost discourse of, what thou maintainest; whether touching Religion, State, or vanity; for if thou erre in the first, thou shalt be accounted profane; if in the second, dangerous; in the third, indiscreet and foolish: He that cannot refrain from much speaking, is like a Citie without walls, and less pains in the world a man cannot take, than to hold his tongue; therefore, if thou observest this rule in all assemblies, thou shalt seldom erre; restrain thy chatter, hearken much, and speak little; for the tongue is the instrument of the greatest good, and greatest evil that is done in the world.

Ac-

According to *Solomon*, *Life and death are in the power of the tongue*: and as *Euripides* truly affirmeth, *Every unbridled tongue in the end shall find it self unfortunate*; for in all that ever I observed in the course of worldly things, I ever found that mens fortunes are oftner made by their tongues than by their virtues, and more mens fortunes overthrown thereby also, than by their vices. And to conclude, all quarrels, mischief, hatred, and destruction, ariseth from unadvised speech, and in much speech there are many errours, out of which thy enemies shall ever take the most dangerous advantage. And as thou shalt be happy, if thou thy self observe these things, so shall it be most profitable for thee to avoid their companies that erre in that kind, and not to hearken to Talebearers, to inquisitive persons, and such as busie themselves with other mens estates, that creep into houses as spies, to learn news which concern them not; for assure thy self such persons are most base and unworthy, and I never knew any of them prosper or respected amongst worthy or wise men.

Take heed also that thou be not found a liar; for a lying spirit is hatefull both to God and man. A liar is commonly a Coward, for he dares not avow truth; a liar is trusted of no man, he can have no credit, either in publick nor private; and if there were no more arguments than this, know that our Lord in S. *John* saith, *That it is a vice proper to Satan*, lying being opposite to the nature of God, which consisteth in Truth; and the gain of lying is nothing else, but not to be trusted of any, nor to be believed when we say the truth. It is said in the *Proverbs*, *That God hateth false lips, and he that speaketh lies, shall perish.* Thus thou mayest see and find in all the Books of God, how odious and contrary to God a liar is; and for the world, believe it, that it never did any man good (except in the extremity of saving life) for a liar is of a base, unworthy, and cowardly spirit.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Three Rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate.

AMongst all other things of the world, take care of thy estate, which thou shalt ever preserve, if thou observe three things; First, that thou know what thou hast, what every thing is worth that thou hast, and to see that thou art not wasted by thy Servants and Officers: The second is, that thou never spend any thing before thou have it, for borrowing is the canker and death of every mans estate: The third is, that thou suffer not thy self to be wounded for other mens faults, and scourged for other mens offences; which is, to be surety for another, for thereby millions of men have been beggered and destroyed, paying the reckoning of other mens riot, and the charge of other mens folly and prodigality; if thou smart, smart for thine own sins, and above all things, be not made an Ass

to carry the burdens of other men: If thy friend desire thee to be his surety, give him a part of what thou hast to spare, if he preis he farther, he is not thy friend at all, for friendship rather chooseth harm to it self, than offereth it: If thou be bound for a stranger, thou art a fool; if for a merchant, thou puttest thy estate to learn to swim; if for a Church-man, he hath no inheritance; if for a Lawyer, he will find an evasion by a syllable or word, to abuse thee; if for a poor man, thou must pay it thy self; if for a rich man, it need not: therefore from Suretiship, as from a Man-slayer, or Enchanter, bless thy self; for the best profit and return will be this, that if thou force him for whom thou art bound, to pay it himself, he will become thy enemy, if thou use to pay it thy self, thou wilt be a beggar; and believe thy Father in this, and print it in thy thought, that what virtue soever thou hast, be it never so manifold, if thou be poor withal, thou, and thy qualities shall be despised: Besides, poverty is oft-times sent as a curse of God, it is a shame amongst men, an imprisonment of the mind, a vexation of

every

every worthy spirit; thou shalt neither help thy self nor others, thou shalt drown in thee all thy virtues, having no means to shew them, thou shalt be a burthen, and an Eye-sore to thy friends, every man will fear thy company, thou shalt be driven basely to beg, and depend on others, to flatter unworthy men, to make dishonest shifts; and to conclude, poverty provokes a man to do infamous and detested deeds: Let no vanity therefore, or perswasion draw thee to that worst of worldly miseries.

If thou be rich, it will give thee pleasure in health, comfort in sickness, keep thy mind and body free, save thee from many perils, relieve thee in thy elder years, relieve the poor, and thy honest Friends, and give means to thy posterity to live, and defend themselves, and thine own fame, where it is said in the *Proverbs*, *That he shall be sore vexed that is surety for a stranger, and he that hateth suretiship is sure*; it is further said, *The poor is hated even of his own neighbour, but the rich have many friends.* Lend not to him that is mightier than thy self, for if thou lendest him, count it but lost;

be not surety above thy power, for if thou be surety, think to pay it.

Chap. VI.

What sort of Servants are fittest to be entertained.

Let thy servants be such as thou mayest command, and entertain none about thee but Yeomen, to whom thou givest wages; for those that will serve thee without thy hire, will cost thee treble as much as they that know thy fare: if thou trust any Servant with thy purse, be sure thou take his account ere thou sleep, for if thou put it off, thou wilt then afterwards for tediousness, neglect it, I my self have thereby lost more than I am worth. And whatsoever thy servant gaineth thereby, he will never thank thee, but laugh thy simplicity to scorn; and besides, it is the way to make thy servants thieves, which else would be honest.

CHAP. VII.

Brave rags wear soonest out of fashion.

EXceed not in the humour of rags and bravery, for these will soon wear out of fashion, but Money in thy purse will ever be in fashion, and no man is esteemed for gay Garments, but by fools and women.

CHAP. VIII.

Riches not to be sought by evil means.

ON the other side, take heed that thou seek not riches basely, nor gain them by evil means, destroy no man for his wealth, nor take any thing from the poor, for the crie and complaint thereof will pierce the Heavens. And it is most detestable before God, and most dishonourable before worthy men, to wrest any thing

from the needy and labouring Soul. God will never prosper thee in ought, if thou offend therein: But use thy poor neighbours and Tennants well, pine not them and their children, to adde superfluity and needless expences to thy self. He that hath pitie on another mans sorrows, shall be free from it himself; and he that delighteth in, and scorneth the misery of another, shall one time or other fall into it himself. Remember this Precept, *He that hath mercy on the poor, lendeth unto the Lord, and the Lord will recompence him what he hath giv n.* I do not understand those for poor, which are vagabonds and beggers; but those that labour to live, such as are old, and cannot travel, such poor widows and fatherless children as are ordered to be relieved, and the poor Tennants that travel to pay their Rents, and are driven to poverty by mischance, and not by riot or careless expences; on such have thou compassion, and God will bless thee for it. Make not the hungry soul sorrowfull, deferre not the guilt of the needy, for if he curse thee in the bitternes of his soul, his prayer shall be heard of him that made him.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

What Inconveniences happen to such as delight in Wine.

TAke especial care that thou delight not in Wine, for there never was any man that came to honour or preferment that loved it; for it transformeth a man into a beast, decayeth health, poisoneth the breath, destroyeth natural heat, brings a mans stomach to an artificial heat, deformeth the face, rotteth the teeth, and to conclude, maketh a man contemptible, soon old, and despised of all wise and worthy men; hated in thy servants, in thy self and companions; for it is a bewitching and infectious vice. And remember my words, that it were better for a man to be subject to any vice, than to it, for all other vanities and sins are recovered, but a Drunkard will never shake off the delight of beastliness, for the longer it possesseth a man, the more he will delight in it, and the elder he groweth,

the more he shall be subject to it; for it dulleth the spirits, and destroyeth the Body, as Ivie doth the old Tree; or as the worm that engendereth in the kernel of the Nut.

Take heed therefore that such a cureless Canker possess not thy youth, nor such a beastly infection thy old age; for then shall all thy life be but as the life of a beast, and after thy death, thou shalt onely leave a shamefull infamy to thy posterity, who shall study to forget that such a one was their Father. *Anacharsis* saith, *The first draught serveth for health, the second for pleasure, the third for shame, the fourth for madness*; but in youth there is not so much as one draught permitted, for it putteth fire to fire, and wasteth the natural heat and seed of generation. And therefore, except thou desire to hasten thine end, take this for a general rule, That thou never adde any artificial heat to thy body by Wine or Spice, until thou find that time hath decayed thy natural heat, and the sooner thou beginnest to help nature, the sooner she will forsake thee, and trust altogether to Art: *Woe be to have misfortune*, saith Solomon,

lomon, who have sorrow and grief, who have trouble without fighting, stripes without cause, and faintness of eyes? even they that sit at wine, and stray themselves to empty Cups: Plinie saith, *VVine maketh the hand quivering, the eyes waterie, the night unquiet, lewd dreams, a stinking breath in the morning, and an utter forgetfulness of all things.*

Whosoever loveth Wine, shall not be trusted of any man, for he cannot keep a secret; Wine maketh a man not onely a beast, but a mad man, and if thou love it, thy own Wife, thy Children, and thy friends will despise thee: In drink men care not what they say, what offence they give, they forget comelinesse, commit disorders; and to conclude, offend all virtuous and honest company, and God most of all; to whom we daily pray for health, and a life free from pain, and yet by drunkenness, and gluttony, (which is the drunkenness of feeding) we draw on, saith *Hesiod*, a swift, hasty, untimely, cruel, and an infamous old age. And S. *Augustine* describeth Drunkenness in this manner: *Ebrietas est blandus Dæmon, dulce venenum,*

suave

ſuave peccatum, quam, qui habet, ſeipſum non habet; quam qui facit, peccatum non facit, ſed ipſi eſt peccatum.

Drunkenneſs is a flattering Devil, a ſweet poiſon, a pleaſant ſin; which whoſoever hath, hath not himſelf, which whoſoever doth commit, doth not commit ſin, but he himſelf wholly is ſin.

Innocentius ſaith, *Quid turpius ebrioſo cui fætor in ore, tremor in corpore, qui promit ſtulta, promit occulta, cui mens alienatur, facies transformatur; nullum ſecretum ubi regnat ebrietas, & quid non aliud deſignat malum, fæcundi calices quem non fecere deſertum.*

What is filthier than a drunken man, to whom there is ſtink in the mouth, trembling in the body; which uttereth fooliſh things, and revealeth ſecret things; whoſe mind is alienate, and face transformed. Whom have not plentifull cups made eloquent and talking?

When DIOGENES ſaw a houſe to be ſold, whereof the owner was given to drink, I thought at the laſt, quoth

quoth *Diogenes*, he would spue out a whole house; *Sciebam inquit, quod domus tandem evomeret.*

CHAP. X.

Let God be thy Protectour and Directour in all thy Actions.

NOw for the World, I know it too well, to perswade thee to dive into the practises thereof, rather stand upon thine own guard against all that tempt thee thereunto, or may practise upon thee in thy conscience, thy reputation, or thy purse; resolve that no man is wise or safe, but he that is honest.

Serve God, let him be the Authour of all thy actions, commend all thy endeavours to him that must either wither or prosper them, please him with prayer, lest if he frown, he confound all thy fortunes and la-

labours, like drops of Rain on the sandy ground: let my experienced advice, and fatherly instructions, sink deep into thy heart; So God direct thee in all his ways, and fill thy heart with his grace.

FINIS.

The dutiful ADVICE of a loving SONNE, *to his aged* FATHER.

LONDON,
Printed by *W. B.* and are to be sold by *W. Sheares* at the sign of the *Bible* over against the North-door of *Pauls*
1650.

The dutifull ADVICE OF A LOVING SON To his *AGED FATHER.*

SIR,

I Humbly beseech you, both in respect of the honour of God, your duty to his Church, and the comfort of your own soul, that you seriously consider in what tearms you stand; and weigh your self in a Christian ballance, taking for your counterpoise the judgements of God: Take heed in time that the word *TEKEL*, writ-

written of old against *Balthazar*, and interpreted by *Daniel*, be not verified in you, whose exposition was, *You have been poized in the scale, and found of too light weight.*

Remember that you are now in the weining, and the date of your pilgrimage well nigh expired, and now that it behoveth you to look towards your Countrey, your forces languisheth, your senses impair, your bodie droops, and on every side the ruinous Cottage of your faint and feeble flesh, threateneth the fall. And having so many harbingers of death to premonish you of your end, how can you but prepare for so dreadfull a stranger. The young man may die quickly, but the old man cannot live long: the young mans life by casualty may be abridged, but the old mans by no physick can be long adjourned, and therefore if green years should sometimes think of the grave, the thoughts of old age should continually dwell in the same.

The prerogative of Infancy is innoceney; of Child-hood, reverence; of Man-hood, maturity; and of old age, wisdom.

And

And seeing then that the chiefest properties of wisdom, are to be mindfull of things past, carefull for things present, and provident for things to come: Use now the priviledge of natures tallent, to the benefit of your own soul, and procure hereafter to be wise in well doing, and watchfull in the fore-sight of future harms. To serve the world you are now unable, and though you were able, yet you have little cause to be willing, seeing that it never gave you but an unhappy welcome, a hurtfull entertainment, and now doth abandon you with an unfortunate fare-wel.

You have long sowed in a field of flint, which could bring nothing forth but a crop of cares, and afflictions of spirit, rewarding your labours with remorse, and affording for your gain, eternal danger.

It is now more than a seasonable time to alter the course of so unthriving a husbandry, and to enter into the field of Gods Church, in which, sowing the seed of repentant sorrow, and watering them with the tears of humble contrition, you may hereafter reap a more beneficial harvest, and gather

ther the fruits of everlasting comfort.

Remember, I pray you, that your spring is spent, your summer over-past, you are now arrived at the fall of the leaf; yea, and winter colours have long since stained your hoary head.

Be not careless (saith Saint Augustine) though our loving Lord bear long with offenders; for the longer he stayes, not finding amendment, the sorer he will scourge when he comes to Judgement: And his patience in so long forbearing, is onely to lend us respite to repent, and not any wise to enlarge us leisure to sin.

He that is tossed with variety of storms, and cannot come to his desired Port, maketh not much way, but is much turmoyled; So, he that hath passed many years, and purchased little profit, hath a long being, but a short life; For, life is more to be measured by well doing, than by number of years: Seeing that most men by many days do but procure many deaths, and others in short space attain to the life of infinite ages; what is the body without the soul, but a corrupt carkass? And what is the soul without God,

God, but a sepulchre of sin?

If God be the Way, the Life, and the Truth, he that goeth without him, strayeth; and he that liveth without him, dieth; and he that is not taught by him, erreth.

Well (saith Saint *Augustine*) *God is our true and chiefest Life, from whom to revolt, is to fall; to whom to return, is to rise, and in whom to stay, is to stand sure.*

God is he, from whom to depart, is to die; to whom to repair, is to revive; and in whom to dwell, is life for ever; Be not then of the number of those that begin not to live, till they be ready to die: and then after a foes desert, come to crave of God a friends entertainment.

Some there be that think to snatch Heaven in a moment, which the best can scarce attain unto in the maintainance of many years, and when they have glutted themselves with worldly delights, would jump from *Dives* Diet, to *Lazarus* Crown, from the service of Satan, to the solace of a Saint.

But be you well assured, that God is not so penurious of friends, as to hold himself and his Kingdom sale-

able

able for the refuse and reversions of their lives, who have sacrificed the principal thereof to his enemies, and their own bruitish lust; then onely ceasing to offend, when the ability of offending is taken from them.

True it is, that a thief may be saved upon the cross, and mercy found at the last gasp; *But well* (saith S. *Augustine*) *though it be possible, yet it is scarce credible, that the death should find favour, whose whole life deserved death; and that the repentance should be more excepted, that more for fear of hell, and love of himself, than for the love of God, and loathsomness of sin crieth for mercy.*

Wherefore, good SIR, make no longer delays; but being so near the breaking up of your mortal house, take time before extremity, to pacifie Gods anger.

Though you suffer the bud to be blasted, though you permitted the fruits to be perished, and the leaves to drie up; yea, though you let the boughs to wither, and the body of your tree to grow to decay, yet (alas) keep life in the root, for fear lest the whole tree become fewel for hell fire;

For

For surely where the tree falleth, there it shall lie, whether towards the South, or to the North, to Heaven, or to hell; and such sap as it bringeth forth, such fruit shall it ever bear.

Death hath already filed from you the better part of your natural forces, and left you now to the Lees, and remissals of your wearyish and dying days.

The remainder whereof, as it cannot be long, so doth it warn you speedily to ransom your former losses; for what is age, but the Calends of death, & what importeth your present weakness, but an earnest of your approching dissolution, you are now imbarked in your final voyage, and not far from the stint and period of your course.

Be not therefore unprovided of such appurtenances as are behovefull in so perplexed and perilous a Journey; death it self is very fearfull, but much more terrible, in respect of the judgement it summoneth us unto.

If you were now laid upon your departing bed, burthened with the heavie load of your former trespasses, and gored with the sting and prick of a fe-

ſtered Conſcience; if you felt the cramp of death wreſtling your heart-ſtrings, and ready to make the ruefull divorce between body and ſoul: If you lay panting for breath, and ſwimming in a cold and pale ſwear, wearied with ſtrugling againſt your deadly pangs, O what would you give for an hours repentance; at what rate would you value a days contrition? Then worlds would be worth leſs in reſpect of a little reſpite, a ſhort truce would ſeem more precious than the treaſures of an Empire, nothing would be ſo much eſteemed as a ſhort trice of time, which now by days, and moneths, and years, is moſt laviſhly miſſpent.

Oh how deeply would it wound your woefull heart, when looking back into your former life, you conſidered many hainous and horrible offences committed, many pious works, and godly deeds omitted, and neither of both repented, your ſervice to God promiſed, and not performed.

Oh how unconſolably were your caſe, your friends being fled, your ſenſes affrighted, your thoughts amazed, your memory decayed, and your whole mind agaſt, and no part able to perform

form what it should; but onely your guilty Conscience pestered with sin, that would continually upbraid you with many bitter accusations.

Oh what would you think then, being stripped out of this mortal weed, and turned out both of service and house room of this wicked world, you are forced to enter into uncouth and strange paths, and with unknown and ugly company, to be convented before a most severe Judge, carrying in your Conscience your Inditement, written in a perfect Register of all your misdeeds, when you shall see him prepared to give sentence upon you, against whom you have so often transgressed, and the same to be your umpire, whom by so many offences you have made your enemies, when not onely the Devil, but even the Angels would plead against you, and your own self, in despight of your self, be your own most sharp appeacher.

Oh what would you do in these dreadfull exigents, when you saw the ghastly Dragon, and huge gulph of hell, breaking out with most fearfull flames, when you heard the weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth; the

rage of those hellish monsters, the horrour of the place, the terrour of the company, and the eternity of all those torments.

Would you then think them wise that should delay in so weighty matters, and idlely play away the time allotted to prevent these intolerable calamities? Would you then count it secure, to nurse in your own bosom so many Serpents as sins? and to foster in your souls so many malicious Accusers, as mortal and horrible offences? Would you not think one life too little to repent in, for so many, and so great iniquities, every one whereof were enough to throw you into those unspeakable and intolerable torments.

And why then (alas) do you not at the least devote that small remnant, and surplusage of these your latter days, procuring to make an atonement with God, and to free your Soul and Conscience from that corruption, which by your fall hath crept into it.

Those very eyes that behold, and read this Discourse, those very ears that are attentive to hear it, and that very understanding that considereth

and

and conceiveth it, shall be cited as certain witnesses of these rehearsed things. In your own body shall you experience these deadly Agonies, and in your soul shall you feelingly find these terrible fears; yea, and your present estate, is in danger of the deepest harms, if you do not the sooner recover your self into that fold and family of Gods faithfull servants.

What have you gotten by being so long a customer to the world, but false ware, suitable to the shop of such a merchant, whose traffique is toyl, whose wealth is trash, and whose gain is miserie? What interest have you reaped, that might equal your detriment in grace and virtue? Or what could you find in the vale of tears, that was answerable to the favour of God, with loss whereof, you were contented to buy it.

You cannot now be inveigled with the passions of youth, which making a partiality of things, sets no distance between counterfeit and currant, for these are now worn out of force, by tract of time are fallen into reproof by trial of their folly.

Oh let not the crazie cowardness of

flesh and blood, damn the prowess of an intelligent person, who by his wisdom canno but discern how much more cause there is, and how much more needfull it is to serve God, than this wicked world.

But is it be the ungrounded presumption of the mercy of God, and the hope of his assistance at the last plunge (which indeed is the ordinary lure of the devil) to reclaim sinners from the pursuit of Repentance. Alas, that is too palpable a pollusion to mislead a sound and serviceable man, howsoever it may prevail with sick and ill-affected judgements: who would rely upon eternal affairs, upon the gliding slipperiness, and running streams of our uncertain life? who, but one of distempered wits, would offer fraud to the Discipherer of all thoughts, with whom dissemble we may to our cost, but to deceive him, is unpossible.

Shall we esteem it cunning to rob the time from him, and bestow it on his enemies, who keepeth tale of the least minutes, and will examine in the end how every moment hath been imployed. It is a preposterous kind of policie, in any wise conceit to fight against

against God till our weapons be blunted, our forces consumed, our limbs impotent, and our best time spent; and then when we fall for faintness, and have fought our selves almost dead, to presume on his mercy.

Oh! no, no, the wounds of his most sacred body, so often dubbed, and renewed by our sins, and every part and parcel of our bodies soldiers, and sundry ways abused, will be then as so many whet-stones and incentives, to edge and exasperate his most just revenge against us.

It is a strange piece of Art, and a very exorbitant course, when the Ship is sound, the Pylot well, the Marriners strong, the Gale favourable, and the Sea calm, to lie idly in the road, burning so seasonable weather. And when the Ship leaketh, the Pylot sick, the Marriners faint, the Storms boysterous, and the Seas a turmoyl of outragious Surges, then to launch forth, (hoise up sail) and set out for a long voyage into a far Country.

Yet such is the skill of these evening Repenters, who though in the soundness of their health, and perfect use of their reason, they cannot resolve to

cut the Cables, and weigh the Anchour that with-holds them from God.

Nevertheless, they feed themselves with a strong persuasion, that when they are astonied, their wits distracted, the understanding dusked, and the bodies and souls wracked, and tormented with the throbs and gripes of a mortal sickness, then forsooth they will begin to think of their weightiest matters, and become sudden Saints, when they are scarce able to behave themselves like reasonable creatures.

No, no, if neither the Canon, Civil, nor the Common Law will allow that man (perished in judgement) should make any Testament of his temporal substance; How can he that is animated with inward garboyls of an unsetled Conscience, distrained with the ringing fits of his dying flesh, maimed in all his ability, and circled in on every side with many and strange incumberances, be thought of due discretion to dispose of his chiefest Jewel, which is his Soul, and to dispatch the whole mannage of all eternity, and of the treasures of Heaven in so short a spurt.

No, no, they that will loyter in seed-time, and begin to sow when others reap;

reap; they that will rior out their health, and begin to cast their accounts when they are scarce able to speak; they that will slumber out the day, and enter their journey when the light doth fail them, let them blame their own folly, if they die in debt, and be eternal beggers, and fall head-long into the lap of endless perdition.

Let such listen to S. *Cyprians* lesson; *Let*, saith he, *the grievousness of our sore be the measure of our sorrow; let a deep wound have a deep and diligent cure; Let no mans contrition be less than his crime.*

F I N I S.